Key Muslim Brotherhood Organizations in the U.S.

Mapping the Brotherhood’s Network in the U.S.

The Brotherhood’s “process of settlement,” outlined in internal strategy papers like An Explanatory Memorandum, has been implemented through a lattice of organizations—some founded directly by the MB, others run by close allies. Historically, the first U.S. beachhead was the Muslim Students Association (MSA) in 1963; from there, the network proliferated—especially through the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA) and North American Islamic Trust (NAIT).

According to Brotherhood documents, the constellation of “our organizations and the organizations of our friends” includes (partial list):

• Islamic Society of North America (ISNA)
• Muslim Students Association (MSA)
• Muslim Communities Association (MCA)
• Association of Muslim Social Scientists (AMSS)
• Association of Muslim Scientists and Engineers (AMSE)
• Islamic Medical Association (IMA)
• Islamic Teaching Center (ITC)
• North American Islamic Trust (NAIT)
• American Trust Publications (ATP) / Islamic Book Service (IBS) / Audio-Visual Center (AVC)
• Muslim Youth of North America (MYNA) / Muslim Arab Youth Association (MAYA)
• United Association for Studies and Research (UASR)
• Islamic Association for Palestine (IAP)
• International Institute for Islamic Thought (IIIT)
• Islamic Circle of North America (ICNA)

(Other major groups—such as CAIR, MPAC, and the Islamic Free Market Institute—were formed after the memorandum but show strong personnel and organizational ties to the same network.)

Why This Matters for Outreach and Policy

To be counted as an MB “organization” or “friend,” a group is expected to embrace the Brotherhood creed:

“Allah is our goal; the Messenger is our guide; the Qur’an is our law; jihad is our way; and martyrdom in the path of Allah is our highest aspiration.”

In practice, the Brotherhood presents itself in the West as non-violent and civic-minded, seeking partnership with government, media, universities, and faith communities. Yet:

• The end state remains sharia supremacy and restoration of a caliphate.
• MB doctrine permits violence when advantageous—its own bylaws call for “fighting the tyrants” as needed to establish an Islamic state.
• Hamas is an outgrowth of the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood, and al-Qaeda leadership has deep Brotherhood roots.

Implication: Government “outreach” that treats sharia-driven groups as benign interlocutors risks legitimizing and empowering organizations whose documented strategy is to influence, infiltrate, and ultimately replace American legal and civic norms.

Understanding the Depth of Muslim Brotherhood Control

Most Muslim organizations in North America are controlled—directly or through close affiliates—by the Muslim Brotherhood or kindred movements (e.g., Hizb ut-Tahrir, Tablighi Jamaat, Jamaat-e-Islami). If someone holds a top title (president, vice president, executive director, general secretary, board member) in one of these Brotherhood-aligned groups—especially if they oversee finances or sit on the Fiqh Council of North America—treat that person as a Muslim Brother. The organization would not entrust that authority to anyone who wasn’t fully aligned.

There are two common “exceptions,” both mostly about optics:

• Women in visible roles. Some groups (notably MSA and ISNA) have put women out front to project a softer, more appealing image. In practice, male Brotherhood leadership still makes key operational decisions.
• Newer youth-led groups. Even when a newer organization isn’t technically an MB front, the message at major MB conferences is clear: Stay inside the Brotherhood’s doctrinal and policy lines, and you’ll receive access and support. Step outside them, and you’ll be isolated.

Groups or leaders who reject sharia supremacy and the MB line are typically ostracized, delegitimized, or threatened. The Brotherhood’s leverage includes claiming doctrinal backing and, where useful, branding dissenters as religious “deviants” or “apostates.” The result is de facto control over most Muslim organizational infrastructure in the U.S., with nominally independent groups having far less reach or influence than the Brotherhood’s network.

Who’s Who in the American Ikhwan

Below are two of the most significant Brotherhood-linked umbrellas operating in the United States.

The Muslim Students Association (MSA)

Founded at the University of Illinois (1962–63), the MSA now has chapters on most major campuses. It is both a recruiting hub and an incubator for other national organizations. Many of today’s prominent U.S. Muslim groups grew out of the MSA, including the Islamic Medical Association, Muslim Arab Youth Association, Association of Muslim Social Scientists, Islamic Circle of North America, and the Islamic Society of North America.

Publicly, MSA presents as a mainstream campus club. In practice, it promotes a sharia-first worldview and runs aggressive dawa (proselytizing) on and off campus. Some chapter leaders have made extreme statements (including calls for violence against Jews) or openly praised designated terrorist groups. MSA chapters also spearhead campus pressure campaigns (e.g., “Israel Apartheid Week”), push for speech controls that mirror sharia blasphemy norms, and work to shut down speakers who challenge the Brotherhood narrative.

The Islamic Society of North America (ISNA)

Created in 1980 to be “a nucleus for the Islamic Movement in North America,” ISNA functions as the Brotherhood’s largest U.S./Canada umbrella. Its role—coordinating dozens of affiliates and “marching to one plan”—has made it the primary public interface with U.S. institutions.

Government standing vs. record. Despite ISNA’s polished image and frequent participation in federal, state, and local “outreach,” the public evidentiary record ties ISNA and its finance arm, NAIT (North American Islamic Trust), to the U.S. Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas support uncovered in the Holy Land Foundation (HLF) terrorism-financing case. In that prosecution, the Department of Justice introduced extensive documents and transactions linking ISNA/NAIT into the Brotherhood’s Palestine Committee network. The court allowed ISNA and NAIT to remain publicly listed as unindicted co-conspirators.

From DOJ’s summary (paraphrased for clarity):

The defendants did not act alone; they operated with a network dedicated to supporting Hamas—through money, propaganda, recruiting, and more. ISNA and NAIT appeared among the organizations created by the U.S. Muslim Brotherhood and were closely connected to HLF’s task of supporting Hamas.

Open questions.

• Why do ISNA leaders still receive high-level access across the federal government?
• Why do ISNA-linked entities retain endorsement authority over Muslim chaplains for the Department of Defense and the Bureau of Prisons?
• Why are ISNA officials training U.S. military leaders on Islam and serving as lead “outreach” partners for agencies tasked with countering domestic threats?

These are not academic concerns; they go to the heart of who shapes the briefings, the hiring pipelines, and the vocabulary used inside U.S. institutions when dealing with sharia-centric networks.

North American Islamic Trust (NAIT)

Created in 1973 with Saudi backing, NAIT is often described as the Muslim Brotherhood’s financial arm in North America. ISNA’s own description (summarized) says NAIT is a nonprofit waqf that supports ISNA, MSA, their affiliates, and other Islamic centers and schools. NAIT holds legal title to hundreds of mosque and school properties—its Islamic Centers Division “safeguards” roughly 300 properties—and “ensures conformity to the Islamic purpose(s) for which their founders established them.” NAIT says it doesn’t run day-to-day operations, but it does advise and align institutions with sharia-compliant aims.

Given ISNA/MSA’s Brotherhood ties, NAIT functions as both enabler and, through property and financing leverage, enforcer for that network’s objectives (sharia implementation and, ultimately, a restored caliphate). In the Holy Land Foundation case, publicly filed exhibits showed financial transactions between NAIT and Hamas-linked entities; NAIT—like ISNA—was listed as an unindicted co-conspirator. A judge denied NAIT’s request to be removed from that list, citing the evidentiary record.

Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR)

Origins and leadership. CAIR was launched in 1994 after a 1993 Philadelphia meeting of senior U.S.-based Hamas operatives and affiliated organizations. Wiretaps captured participants—including future CAIR founders Omar Ahmad and Nihad Awad—discussing Hamas strategy and the need for a new public-relations front disconnected from existing Brotherhood/Hamas entities. Both men previously held leadership roles in the Islamic Association of Palestine (IAP), whose chairman, Mousa Abu Marzook, was then Hamas’s top U.S. leader and a globally senior Hamas figure.

The “Palestine Committee” plan. Internal Muslim Brotherhood records later entered in court detailed an international decision to create Palestine Committees in each country to support Hamas with “media, money, and men.” In the United States, that committee oversaw the IAP, the Occupied Land Fund (later HLF), and the United Association for Studies and Research (UASR)—and added CAIR as part of the ecosystem. A U.S. list of American members of the Palestine Committee included Omar Ahmad and Nihad Awad by name.

Court posture and fallout. In the Holy Land Foundation prosecution, the government introduced extensive documentary and testimonial evidence linking CAIR and its founders to HLF, IAP, the U.S. Palestine Committee, and Hamas’s broader support network. CAIR was named an unindicted co-conspirator; its motion to be removed from that list was denied. In 2008 the FBI announced it would suspend official outreach to CAIR. Even so, CAIR has continued to position itself as a mainstream civil-rights group while at times advising members not to cooperate with FBI inquiries.

Inside CAIR operations. The book Muslim Mafia (2009) drew on internal CAIR documents obtained by a covert intern to describe CAIR’s information operations, political influence efforts, and ties within the broader Brotherhood network. In response to Congressional inquiries, the Department of Justice provided trial materials confirming the relationship among CAIR, its founders, the U.S. Palestine Committee, and Hamas.

Foreign funding and lobbying questions. Public compilations of CAIR’s overseas funding and activities have raised concerns that CAIR operates as an unregistered foreign agent, prompting referrals to the Department of Justice and reports of grand jury interest.

Bottom line. NAIT, ISNA, and CAIR emerged and operate within the same organizational lattice—the U.S. arm of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Palestine Committee network that supported Hamas. Their roles differ (property/finance; umbrella/legitimacy; public-relations/advocacy), but the strategic through-line is consistent: advancing sharia-centric objectives while cultivating influence inside American institutions.

Muslim American Society (MAS)

Incorporated on June 11, 1993 (77 West Washington St., Chicago), MAS was founded by three senior Muslim Brotherhood figures: Omar Soubani, Jamal Badawi, and Ahmad Elkadi.

• Soubani appears in Brotherhood leadership records for North America and on a U.S. list of members of the Palestine Chapter (Hamas).
• Badawi is a prominent Brotherhood ideologue, serves on the Fiqh Council of North America, and was named an unindicted co-conspirator in the HLF case.
• Elkadi served as General Masul (General Guide) of the Brotherhood in America in the late 1980s–mid-1990s.

In 2000, MAS merged with ICNA (listed in the Brotherhood’s own memoranda). In a federal appellate proceeding (Benkahla), prosecutors flatly described MAS as “the overt arm of the Muslim Brotherhood in America.”

MAS operates nationwide (≈50 chapters) and is notably political. Through its 501(c)(4) MAS Freedom Foundation, it lobbies and engages in campaigns, often in alliance with hard-left coalitions (e.g., International ANSWER). Mahdi Bray, MAS Freedom’s longtime executive director, is a frequent public face for these efforts and has defended or advocated for several convicted or accused Islamist figures. Despite local outreach efforts, MAS has faced community pushback (e.g., Staten Island convent mosque proposal rejected).

Fiqh Council of North America (FCNA)

Formerly ISNA’s Fiqh Committee, FCNA appears on the Brotherhood’s internal roster. Its charter role is to ensure Brotherhood-aligned activities track Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh)/sharia in North America.

Founding trustees: Jamal Barzinji, Taha J. Al-Alwani, and Abdurahman Alamoudi—each a major Brotherhood organizer; Alamoudi later pled guilty to terrorism-related offenses. FCNA works closely with ISNA, which urges chapters to use sharia arbitration panels—a ready framework for introducing parallel religious adjudication in U.S. communities.

Muslim Public Affairs Council (MPAC)

Origins. Began in 1986 as the political arm of the Islamic Center of Southern California; spun out as MPAC in 1988. Founders Hassan and Maher Hathout were close to Brotherhood founder Hassan al-Banna; Maher later served on Abdurahman Alamoudi’s American Muslim Council board.

Leadership & positions. Current president Salam Al-Marayati has taken positions supportive of groups hostile to Israel and has been denied certain federal appointments over such views. MPAC communications staff (e.g., Edina Lekovic) previously edited student publications praising Osama bin Laden. Functionally, MPAC serves as a messaging/advocacy arm, pressing U.S. agencies and media to sanitize terminology (avoid “jihad,” “caliphate,” “ummah,” “sharia” in CT contexts) and promoting narratives casting sharia as compatible with the U.S. constitutional order—positions this report contests.

American Muslim Task Force (AMTF)

AMTF bills itself as an umbrella for political mobilization and civil-rights engagement. Its own site has listed affiliates that read like a who’s-who of Brotherhood-linked groups in the U.S.: CAIR, ICNA, ISNA, MAS, MPAC, MSA, and others. AMTF materials emphasize electioneering and lawmaker outreach, consistent with the Brotherhood’s “phased plan” to build influence blocs and normalize its network as the primary voice of Muslim Americans.

The Muslim Brotherhood’s U.S. Operations: Exemplars

By the mid-1990s, the Brotherhood’s phased approach had positioned its network to run broad influence campaigns across American institutions—government, schools, media, faith communities, and local civic life. Recent years show growing aggressiveness. Illustrative examples:

• Law-enforcement & intelligence. Targeted outreach aims to blunt or deflect investigations, narrow training on sharia/jihad/MB, and position Brotherhood-linked voices as the government’s default “experts” on Islam—thereby shaping policy and curricula from inside the system.
• Education (K–12 and universities). Pressure on school boards and textbook committees softens how Islam, sharia, and jihad are presented. Major university Middle East programs, buoyed by large Gulf-sourced gifts, adopt curricula and public programming that track Brotherhood narratives and priorities.
• Interfaith venues. Under the banner of “dialogue,” Brotherhood operatives cultivate clergy and lay leaders, who then provide political cover—e.g., framing opposition to specific Brotherhood-tied mosque projects as intolerance rather than due-diligence concerns.
• Civic leadership optics. Mayors, council members, and other public figures are courted to normalize Brotherhood fronts, repeat their talking points, and denounce scrutiny as “un-American,” thereby chilling oversight and financial transparency queries.
• Finance sector. Sharia-compliant finance (SCF) is promoted as an ethical alternative while embedding sharia-board gatekeepers and legitimizing parallel legal/religious standards within U.S. markets. Public-sector encouragement further mainstreams SCF products and governance models.

In combination, the Brotherhood’s stealth campaigns and the coercive or violent efforts of overt jihadist groups function as a strategic pincer—one arm normalizing and insulating the ideology, the other intimidating and punishing resistance—posing a sustained threat to constitutional norms and open civic life.

---