Sharia and Jihad

Shariah—drawn from Islam’s foundational texts—defines doctrines including the obligation of jihad against non-believers. The key question: does “jihad” mean a private moral struggle, or warfare to establish a global Islamic state (caliphate) governed by shariah?

The Quran and Jihad

Shariah rulings sit within fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence). Fiqh turns first to the Quran and then to how classical jurists interpreted its verses. Reading verses without that legal context leads to misunderstanding.

Classical scholars point to many Quranic passages about fighting non-Muslims—covering campaigns, combat, and division of spoils. Frequently cited examples include: “Fighting is prescribed for you” (Q 2:216); “Slay them wherever you find them” (Q 4:89); “Fight the idolaters utterly” (Q 9:36).

Among the most cited is the “Verse of the Sword”:

“So when the sacred months have passed, then fight and slay the pagans wherever you find them, and seize them, beleaguer them, and lie in wait for them in every stratagem of war; but if they repent and establish regular prayers, and practice regular charity, then leave their way free to them; for surely Allah is Forgiving, Merciful.” (Q 9:5)

For polytheists, classical doctrine summarizes this as: convert or be fought. For “People of the Book” (Christians and Jews), Sura 9 adds a third path:

“Fight those who believe not in God nor the Last Day… even if they be People of the Book… until they pay the Jizya with willing submission and feel themselves subdued.” (Q 9:29)

So Christians and Jews may convert, be fought, or submit under Muslim rule as dhimmis.

In both the Quran and later usage, jihad is often followed by fi sabil Allah—“in the path of Allah.” This frames jihad as divinely sanctioned warfare, distinct from ordinary tribal fighting.

The Hadiths and Jihad

The hadith (the second source of shariah) consistently treats jihad as warfare. The most authoritative collections—Sahih al-Bukhari and Sahih Muslim—contain hundreds of references in this martial sense.

A widely cited report states:

“I have been ordered to fight with the people till they say, ‘None has the right to be worshipped but Allah,’ and whoever says it, his life and property will be saved by me except for Islamic laws, and his accounts will be with Allah (either to punish him or to forgive him).”

This grounds an open-ended command: fight “the people” who do not worship Allah until they submit to Islam’s legal order. It speaks to subjugation to Islamic law, not merely private belief.

The Classical Sources on Jihad

Beyond Quran and hadith, classical manuals codify jihad as holy war and spell out how Muslims are to advance it.

A standard Shafi‘i manual, Reliance of the Traveller (Umdat al-Salik), states:

“Jihad means to wage war against non-Muslims, and is etymologically derived from the word mujahada, signifying warfare to establish the religion. And it is the lesser Jihad.”

It also notes that the popular “greater/inner struggle” narration is weak/inauthentic and not legally binding—so the operative legal meaning of jihad remains armed struggle.

Reliance further quotes:

“I have been commanded to fight the people until they testify that there is no god but Allah and that Mohammed is the Messenger of Allah, and perform the prayer, and pay the zakat. If they say it, they have saved their blood and possessions from me, except for the rights of Islam over them.”

Parallel treatments appear across other schools: the Hanafi classic Al-Hidayah (12th c.), the Maliki work Ibn Rushd’s Distinguished Jurist’s Primer (Book Ten is “Jihad”), and the early Hanafi Shaybani Siyar, translated by Majid Khadduri as The Islamic Law of Nations, the oldest nearly complete legal text on Islamic warfare.

Contemporary Advocates of Jihad

In the 20th century, Abu al-A‘la Mawdudi reframed jihad in the rhetoric of revolution and anti-colonial struggle. His ideas influenced Hasan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb of the Muslim Brotherhood, who argued not only against foreign rule but also against Muslim rulers judged apostate for failing to uphold shariah—“the near enemy.” Mawdudi’s line draws on the medieval jurist Ibn Taymiyya, who permitted overthrowing unjust governments.

In Qutb’s Milestones, he makes the objective explicit:

“The reasons for Jihad… are these: to establish God’s authority in the earth; to arrange human affairs according to the true guidance provided by God; to abolish all the Satanic forces and Satanic systems of life; to end the lordship of one man over others… No one has the authority to make them his servants or to make arbitrary laws for them. These reasons are sufficient for proclaiming Jihad.”

By “Satanic systems,” Qutb means Western-style liberal democracy; by “the lordship of one man,” he rejects rule by human lawmaking in favor of divine law.

These ideas inspired militants from the assassins of Anwar Sadat to Ayman al-Zawahiri’s Egyptian Islamic Jihad, whose tract The Neglected Duty glorifies violent jihad to “enjoin the good and forbid evil,” urging Muslims to “exert every conceivable effort” to restore the caliphate and expand Dar al-Islam.

Another emblematic text is The Quranic Concept of War (1979) by Pakistani Brig. Gen. S. K. Malik. Pakistan’s military leadership publicly embraced it at the time as doctrinal—treating jihad as an all-of-society, psychological and military struggle sanctioned by scripture.

Other Sources on Jihad

Contemporary clerics continue to present jihad in overtly martial terms. In 2010, Islamic cleric Iman al-Khashab wrote that violent warfare against infidels is so central that some scholars call it “the sixth pillar of Islam.”

“Jihad in the path of Allah is a mainstay of the religion and a great religious duty… The Prophet desired it himself, and urged others to it… some scholars consider it the sixth pillar of Islam, due to its importance.”

The Shiite and Iranian Views of Jihad

Classical Shi‘a jurisprudence traditionally tied offensive jihad to the presence of the rightful Imam. Over centuries, leading Shi‘a jurists created workarounds—allowing designees or jurist-scholars (fuqaha) to declare jihad, and Shi‘a dynasties at times waged expansionist wars without the Imam’s physical presence.

In 1970, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini systematized this move with Velayat-e Faqih (Rule of the Jurisprudent), asserting that senior jurists could exercise the Imam’s political-religious authority. After 1979, Iran advanced an openly offensive understanding of jihad aligned with Sunni hardliners.

Khomeini stated plainly:

“Islam says: Whatever good there is exists thanks to the sword… The sword is the key to Paradise, which can be opened only for Holy Warriors! … I spit upon those foolish souls who make such a claim [that Islam prevents war].”

Iran’s 1989 constitution embeds this outlook in its chapter on the IRGC:

The Guards are responsible not only for safeguarding frontiers, but for a religious mission: Holy War (JIHAD) “along the way of God,” and “the struggle to extend the supremacy of God’s Law in the world.”

It then cites Quran 8:60—“prepare your strength… to strike terror into the hearts of the enemies of God”—the same verse used on the Sunni Muslim Brotherhood’s emblem. In the 1990s, this pan-Islamic framing underpinned practical cooperation among Iran, Hezbollah, and Sunni jihadists connected to al-Qaeda, seen in attacks from Khobar Towers to the East Africa embassies, the USS Cole, and culminating in 9/11.

Bottom Line

Across modern Sunni and Shi‘a currents, the through-line remains the same: jihad as a divinely mandated means to install shariah and, ultimately, a global caliphate. Within classical doctrine and modern ideologies alike, the operative legal meaning of jihad is armed struggle, not merely private moral effort.

Jihad Is Obligatory

Core claim: In classical shariah, participation in jihad is a duty.

• The Quran states:
  “Prescribed for you is fighting, though it be hateful to you.” (Q 2:216)
• Historian-jurist Ibn Khaldun wrote that holy war is a religious duty tied to Islam’s universal mission to bring all people under Islam, “by persuasion or by force,” arguing Islam is “under obligation to gain power over other nations.”
• Duty tiers:
  • Collective duty (fard kifayah): If a sufficient number fight, the rest are excused.
  • Individual duty (fard ‘ayn): Becomes personal when Muslim lands are invaded or occupied.
• Ibn Rushd (Averroës) summarizes the scholarly consensus: jihad is ordinarily a collective obligation, grounded in verses like Q 9:122 and Q 4:95, and historically the Prophet never deployed all believers at once.
• Scope and treatment of enemies (classical doctrine summarized by jurists):
  • “All polytheists should be fought… ‘Fight them until there is no persecution and the religion is Allah’s entirely…’” (Q 8:39)
  • Captives may be pardoned, enslaved, killed, or ransomed, or released as dhimmis under jizya (poll tax), at the discretion of the Caliph/Imam.

Waging Jihad

Foundational manuals lay out how jihad is conducted between Dar al-Islam (lands under shariah) and Dar al-Harb (all others).

• Al-Shaybani (Hanafi), Siyar (Law of Nations):
  Calls for a standing state of hostility with Dar al-Harb and details rules of engagement:
  

  “Fight in the name of Allah and in the ‘path of Allah.’ Combat those who disbelieve in Allah. Do not cheat or commit treachery, nor should you mutilate anyone or kill children. Whenever you meet your polytheist enemies, invite them [first] to adopt Islam. If they do so, accept it, and let them alone. If they refuse, then call upon them to pay the jizya… if they do, accept it and leave them alone. If the army attacks Dar al-Harb… it is commendable to renew the invitation, but if it fails to do so it is not wrong. The army may attack by night or by day, and it is permissible to burn fortifications or inundate them with water.”

• Ibn Abi Zayd al-Qayrawani (Maliki):
  Repeats the legal requirement to invite before hostilities and notes the choice for Jews and Christians:
  

  “Jihad is a precept of Divine institution… It is preferable not to begin hostilities… before having invited [the enemy] to embrace the religion of Allah… They have the alternative of either converting to Islam or paying the poll tax (jizya), short of which war will be declared against them.”

• Ibn Taymiyya (Hanbali):
  Focuses on ensuring “Allah’s word is uppermost”; noncombatants are not to be killed unless they actively aid the fight:
  

  “Those who stand in the way of this aim must be fought… Women, children, monks, old people… shall not be killed unless they actually fight with words (propaganda) or acts (spying or otherwise assisting in the warfare).”

Civilization Jihad

Two tracks, one goal: Classical doctrine treats violent jihad and pre-violent/stealth jihad as parts of the same obligation—the subjugation of Dar al-Harb to shariah.

• Dawa (the call to Islam) is legally required before armed jihad and functions as the front end of a broader campaign to prepare societies for shariah’s rule.
• What some call “civilization jihad” (or “stealth jihad”) uses nonviolent methods—legal, cultural, financial, educational, bureaucratic—to infiltrate and reshape institutions without open conflict.
• The text argues this pre-violent approach can be harder to detect and counter in liberal, multicultural societies, yet pursues the same end state as kinetic warfare.

Implication for threat analysis (as argued in the source text):

• U.S. doctrine should begin with an unconstrained reading of the enemy’s stated doctrine.
• Whether outsiders judge that doctrine to reflect “true Islam” is irrelevant for security planning; what matters is what actors themselves cite to justify actions.
• Failing to orient on the doctrine adversaries claim for themselves violates basic principles of strategy—“know the enemy”—and risks misidentifying or underestimating the threat.

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