Sharia as a Security Issue

Successfully protecting the United States against jihadist threats requires understanding several built-in attributes of Sharia that shape the character and persistence of the threat.

Treaties and Truces

Shariah jurists hold that the Muslim community’s objective is to spread submission to shariah through jihad. Strength matters: when Muslims are strong, offensive jihad is commanded, drawing on the verse:

“So do not be fainthearted and call for peace, when it is you who are the uppermost.” (Q 47:35)

When facing a stronger enemy, shariah prohibits rash attacks that risk wider harm to Muslims. This restraint is framed as not “transgressing the limits”:

“Fight in the cause of Allah those who fight you, but do not transgress limits; for Allah loveth not transgressors.” (Q 2:190)

Launching jihad prematurely—inviting retaliation, invasion, and Muslim casualties—is treated as “spreading mischief in the land,” a grave offense:

“If any one slew a person—unless it be for murder or for spreading mischief in the land—it would be as if he slew the whole people….” (Q 5:32)

“The punishment of those who wage war against Allah and His Messenger, and strive with might and main for mischief through the land is: execution, or crucifixion, or the cutting off of hands and feet from opposite sides, or exile from the land….” (Q 5:33)

Following this logic, shariah permits treaties or truces when Muslims are too weak to prevail—famously, the Treaty of Hudaybiyyah (628), a 10-year truce Muhammad concluded when his forces were not yet strong enough to take Mecca. Two years later, once stronger, he broke the truce and entered Mecca. Related sayings underscore tactical flexibility:

“War is deceit.”
“If I take an oath and later find something else better than that, then I do what is better and expiate my oath.”

Modern echoes include Yasser Arafat’s references to Hudaybiyyah after the Oslo Accords (framing a temporary pause as a hudna) and periodic Hamas offers of a 10-year truce—moves consistent with classic jurisprudence that allows truces when advantageous, and to be ended when conditions favor renewed jihad.

Still, truces are generally disfavored in shariah because they suspend jihad. When prospects favor success, calls for peace are rejected:

“So do not be fainthearted and call for peace, when it is you who are the uppermost.” (Q 47:35)

In short: treaties and truces are tactical, not final. They are used when weakness dictates, and set aside when strength returns.

Sacred Space

Shariah is territorial in outlook. All land ultimately “belongs” to Allah’s community; territory once brought under Islamic rule is treated as waqf—sacred endowment to the ummah—forever. If lost, it should be reclaimed, by jihad if necessary. Regions often cited include Chechnya, al-Andalus (Iberia), Hind (the Indian subcontinent), and the State of Israel.

The process of sacralizing space can be gradual. Communities first sanctify private and mosque space, then extend outward into public life. In Europe (fueled in part by Gulf funding), prominent mosques with tall minarets signal Islamic presence and authority. As Turkey’s (then-mayor, later) Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan put it in 1998:

“The mosques are our barracks, the domes our helmets, the minarets our bayonets, and the faithful our soldiers.”

Neighborhoods around major mosques may consolidate into Muslim-only enclaves that informally enforce shariah norms and discourage or exclude non-Muslims. In some European cities, police have been reluctant to enter certain areas, effectively ceding local sovereignty and allowing shariah practices to supersede civil law.

Historically, conquerors have marked sacred dominance by building mosques atop other faiths’ holy sites—e.g., Hagia Sophia in Istanbul, the al-Aqsa and Dome of the Rock on Jerusalem’s Temple Mount, and the Great Mosque of Córdoba. Symbolism persists in naming—e.g., proposals in New York near Ground Zero by a group calling itself the Cordoba Initiative.

Even near sacred space, non-Muslims can feel pressure to conform—such as donning headscarves for interviews or official visits—amounting to pre-emptive deference (dhimmitude) under the assumption that such gestures improve relations.

Apostasy

In shariah, kufr means unbelief. The classic manual Reliance of the Traveller (Book O: “Justice,” chapter on apostasy) states plainly:

“Leaving Islam is the ugliest form of unbelief and the worst.”

“Whoever voluntarily leaves Islam is killed.”

“When a person who has reached puberty and is sane voluntarily apostatizes from Islam, he deserves to be killed.”

A well-known modern example: Abdul Rahman of Afghanistan converted to Christianity. When authorities learned of it, he was sentenced to death for apostasy. International pressure (including threatened loss of EU aid) created a political bind for President Hamid Karzai: uphold Islamic law and execute Rahman, or spare him and risk losing critical support. The workaround was to declare Rahman insane, one of the few shariah-based avenues to avoid executing an apostate.

Under shariah, reasons for declaring someone an apostate include denying any verse of the Qur’an or rejecting what scholarly consensus deems obligatory. In practice, disagreement with doctrines on which scholars have reached consensus can be treated as apostasy—foreclosing efforts to “reform” those elements.

Reliance further ranks unlawful acts into three levels: minor sins; enormities; and unbelief (kufr)—which puts one outside Islam and requires a renewed Testification of Faith (reciting the Shahada) to re-enter.

Contemporary apologists sometimes soften this by arguing the state punishes only “public” apostasy. As one prominent writer put it: punishment is to “enforce Islamic law and maintain order,” not to force belief. The upshot, however, is blunt: private apostasy may be ignored; public or discovered apostasy is punishable.

Bottom line: in doctrinal shariah, communal cohesion and outward conformity take precedence over individual conscience.

Permissible Lying

National-security professionals should understand that, in shariah, lying can be permissible—and sometimes required—in certain circumstances. This complicates assessments of intent and credibility.

There are two standards at work. Generally, deceiving fellow Muslims is condemned—“God guides not him who is…a liar.” Yet both Qur’anic verses and authoritative hadiths create explicit exceptions.

Reliance of the Traveller gives practical examples where lying—even to Muslims—can be allowed, such as preventing wrongdoing or reconciling people:

“He who settles disagreements between people to bring about good or says something commendable is not a liar.”

Another oft-cited report narrows the permission to three contexts:

“I did not hear him permit untruth in anything people say, except for three things: war, settling disagreements, and a man talking with his wife or she with him (smoothing over differences).”

With respect to non-Muslims, shariah sources go further. Reliance (Book R: “Holding One’s Tongue”) quotes the eminent jurist al-Ghazali to the effect that lying is conditionally licit:

“Lying is sometimes permissible for a given interest… When it is possible to achieve such an aim by lying but not by telling the truth, it is permissible to lie if attaining the goal is permissible, and obligatory to lie if the goal is obligatory.”

Related texts also allow creating a misleading impression when an interest recognized by sacred law requires it:

“Scholars say that there is no harm in giving a misleading impression if required by an interest countenanced by Sacred Law.”

Supporting maxims include the Prophet’s statement:

“If I take an oath and later find something else better than that, then I do what is better and expiate my oath.”

And verses that speak of released vows or divine leading, which are cited to justify flexible commitments.

In short: within classical jurisprudence, deception is treated as a tool—permitted (and at times mandated) in contexts like war, reconciliation, and protecting recognized interests. Understanding that doctrinal framework is essential when evaluating statements and agreements through a security lens.

Taqiyya

Closely tied to shariah’s rules on lying is taqiyya—often described as religiously sanctioned concealment or dissimulation “for the sake of Islam,” especially toward non-Muslims. Classical sources ground it in Qur’an 3:28 and 16:106, supported by hadith, tafsir (commentary), and juristic writings that permit believers to hide true beliefs under threat or when operating in hostile environments.

“Let not the believers take the disbelievers as friends instead of the believers… unless you indeed fear a danger from them.” (Q 3:28)

Authoritative commentaries explain that when danger exists, showing outward friendliness to non-Muslims may be allowed while retaining inner opposition:

“We smile in the face of some people although our hearts curse them.”

Some jurists go further, calling taqiyya mainstream across Islamic sects and widely used in politics, describing it as an accepted tool for self-protection and strategic messaging. Modern analysts summarize the practice this way: concealing beliefs or strategies in times of danger can split and confuse an enemy and enable two audiences/two messages—one for the faithful, another for outsiders.

This dual-track communications logic has surfaced in real-world contexts. In one recorded strategy discussion about public messaging in the U.S., a participant emphasized sending one message to Americans and another to Muslims, warning that if the split messaging were exposed later, it could discredit the effort among Muslim audiences.

Classical exegetes likewise read Q 3:28 as allowing outward accommodation when non-Muslims hold power:

“Behave loyally to them with your tongue, while harboring inner animosity… when infidels are above them in authority.”

“Whoever… fears their evil may protect himself through outward show… ‘Let us smile to the face of some people while our hearts curse them.’”

Taqiyya in Practice

A frequently cited example is the dual messaging of Yusuf al-Qaradawi (widely regarded as a leading Sunni jurist). In Arabic venues aimed at Muslims, he has condemned secularism and affirmed that rule must be by shariah:

“…The acceptance of secularism means abandonment of shariah… Its acceptance… is downright apostasy.”

“There are those who maintain that democracy is the rule of the people, but we want the rule of Allah.”

Yet in other venues—especially English-language outlets aimed at Western audiences—he has framed Islam as supportive of democracy, emphasizing votes and choice of leaders. The goal presented to insiders (rule by shariah) and the language presented to outsiders (democratic compatibility) can differ markedly, illustrating the doctrinal basis for audience-specific narratives.

It is sometimes claimed taqiyya is only a Shi‘ite concept. Historically, Shi‘ites did emphasize it to avoid persecution by Sunni majorities. But the permission to conceal or mislead under threat—or for strategic advantage—appears in Sunni sources as well, and is cited by Sunni jurists and commentators.

Why this matters for security: Classical doctrine treats deception as a lawful tool—especially in war—and envisions a permanent state of enmity between lands under shariah and those not under it until “religion is Allah’s entirely.” Understanding taqiyya’s role helps analysts evaluate pledges, dialogues, and public statements that might be tailored for non-Muslim consumption while signaling different aims to Muslim audiences.

This is not a call to prejudge any individual. It is a practical reminder that U.S. officials and security professionals should know the doctrinal framework that permits—at times even requires—withholding or reshaping truth for strategic ends. Knowing that framework is part of competent threat assessment.

Slander

Shariah’s emphasis on information control doesn’t stop at permitting deception; it also penalizes disclosure. In classical manuals, slander (ghiba) and talebearing (namima) are defined much more broadly than in the West, creating a code of silence that can shield insiders and doctrine from outside scrutiny.

“Slander (ghiba) means to mention anything concerning a person that he would dislike.”

“Talebearing (namima) consists of quoting someone’s words to another in a way that worsens relations between them.”

The Prophet is reported to have said: “The talebearer will not enter Paradise.”
“Do you know what slander is? … It is to mention of your brother that which he would dislike.” When asked, “What if he is as I say?” he replied, “If he is as you say, you have slandered him, and if not, you have calumniated him.”
“The Muslim is the brother of the Muslim. He does not betray him, lie to him, or hang back from coming to his aid.”

“Talebearing… consists of revealing anything whose disclosure is resented… The reality of talebearing lies in divulging a secret… A person should not speak of anything he notices about people besides that which benefits a Muslim to relate or prevents disobedience.”

Read together with rules on lying and taqiyya, these definitions help explain how public denials can coexist with private endorsements: revealing internal disagreements, vulnerabilities, or doctrines “whose disclosure is resented” is itself treated as a religious offense. Practically, that means a shariah-adherent insider may feel religious pressure not to share information with non-Muslim authorities if it could disadvantage a Muslim or Islam. For security services, relying on sources shaped by these rules can complicate collection, verification, and analysis.

Blasphemy

A parallel constraint falls on non-Muslims: blasphemy rules. In this framework, outsiders are expected to avoid speech deemed offensive to Islam or exceeding what they are permitted to discuss. The result is a powerful speech boundary that suppresses frank examination of doctrine, intentions, or conduct.

When institutions adopt policies that mirror these prohibitions—whether by choice or misunderstanding—the effect is self-censorship: training omits core doctrinal content; analysts avoid plain descriptions; leaders lack a shared factual baseline. Situational awareness erodes, and debate over appropriate responses to threats is stifled.

A better approach is straightforward: build assessments on primary-source doctrine and facts, present them clearly, and allow open debate. Sound strategy requires that nothing essential be placed out of bounds.

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